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Death, Population Growth, Productivity Growth
and Debt Neutrality
Abstract
Debt neutrality is said to occur if, given a program for public
spending on current goods and services over time, the real equilibrium of the
economy (private consumption, investment, relative prices, etc.) is
independent of the pattern of government borrowing and lump-sum taxation over
time. _The paper brings together work of Blanchard on individual uncertain
lifetimes and debt neutrality and Weil on population growth and debt
neutrality. It is shown that there will be debt neutrality if and only if the
sum of the rate of growth of population and the individual probability of
death equals zero. If this condition holds, non-zero rates of growth of lebor
productivity will not destroy debt neutrality.
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I.

Introduction
This paper reconsiders the necessary and sufficient conditions for

debt neutrality.

There is debt neutrality if, given a program for public

expenditure on current goods and services over time, the real equilibrium of
the economy is not affected by a change in the pattern over time of lump-sum
taxes.

If there is debt neutrality for instance, the substitution of

borrowing today for lump-sum taxation today (followed by such further changes
in the time path of future lump-sum taxes as are required for maintaining
government solvency) does not affect the current and future behavior of
private consumption and capital formation.

I consider this issue in a simple closed economy gro~th model.

There

is a single produced commodity which can be consumed privately, consumed

publicly or used in private capital formation.

Population and labor supply

grow at the constant exogenous inptantaneous proportional rate n.

Labor

augmenting ~echnical change occurs at the constant exogenous instantaneous
proportional rate

~.

Private consumption behavior is modeled following the

Yaari-Blanchard uncertain lifetimes approach (Yaari [1965], Blanchard (1984,
1985]).

The constant instantaneous probability of death of each individual i.s

X? O.
The paper combines the results of Blanchard [1984, 1985] about debt
neutrality and unr.ertain lifetimes and of Weil [1985] about debt neutrality
and population growth and completes the triad by considering the implications
of productivity giowth for debt neutrality.
Blanch,ud showed that uncertain lifetimes
absence of ·debt neutrality.

{;\. > 0) are sufficient for

They drive a wedge between effective (risk

adjusted) private sector discount rates and go,ernment discount rates.

The

future flow of resources expected to be availc:.ble to those private agents
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currently alive grows at the exponential rate n-A.

Governments can tax the

resources not only of those private agents currently alive, but also of those
yet to be born.

Their resource base grows at the exponential rate n+n.

In

Blanchard's model, the size of the total population is non-stochastic and
Weil showed that even with infinite-lived consumers, population

constant.

g~ow~h alone

(n > 0) would, again by expanding the intertemporal resource

base of the government beyond that available to those households currently

alive, destroy debt neutrality.

For debt neutrality, intergeneration al
Infinite

linkages are necessary (say through an operative bequest motive).

n * O.

horizons for "isolated" individual consumers are insufficient if
In this paper I show that
debt neutrality.

A,+ n = 0 is necessary and sufficient for

It follows that, as long as

productivity growth

A+ n = O, non-zero

(n * 0) does not destroy neutrality.

that productivity g~owth, with

The intuition is

l + n = O, augments equally the future

resource bases of the'individual consumer and the government.
I also show that, even th9ugh the probability of death

A and

population growth enter additively in the criterion for debt neutrality,
changes in

A will have different effects on the economy from changes inn

(and changes in

n). ·

·Section II develops the model.

Section III gives the conditions far

debt neutrality in a rather general way, for any pattern of lump-sum taxation

over time that is consistent with government solvency.

Section IV gives a

more detailed analysis of a specifit kind of ta:r. policy: a short-run cut in
lump-s~m taxes which, over time, 1s transformed into a long-run increase 1n
lump-sum taxes.

Se~tion V uses this example to illustrate the different

effects of changes _in

A, n and n on the behavior of the economic sys.tern.

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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The Model
A.

The Individual's Consumption Behavior

I shail use the simplest version of the Yaari-Blanchard model of
consumer behavior (Yaari [1985]), Blanchard (1984, 1985]).

The only novelty

is in the consideration of population growth and productivity growth in the
subsection on aggregation.
At each instant t, a consumer born at time

s

~

t solves the

following problem.

(1)

max

J;e -o(v-t) inc(s,v)dv

W(s,t) =

o>

0

{c(s,v)}
Et is the expectation operator conditional on period t information;
individual consumption of the single good;
preference.

c is

o is the pure rate of time

During his or her lifetim~ each consumer faces a common and

constant iqstantaneous probability of death (or probability of dynastic
extinction through childlessness)

l

~

O.

The probability at time t of
.

surviving until time v ~tis therefore given bye

-\(v-t)

•

Equation (1) can

therefore be rewritten as
m

(2)

max
J te
{c(s,v)}

-(o+\)(v-t) 1nc(s,~)dv

The consumer's instantaneous flow budget identity is given by

(3)

:t a(s,t) _ (r(t)+\) a(s,t) + ~(s,t) - ~(s,t) - c{s,t).

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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a is the consumer's financial or non-human wealth.
instantaneous real intere~t rate,; the real wage and

r i!'the

7 lump-sum taxes net of

transfers.

The term la on the r.h.s of· (3) reflects the operation of efficient
life insurance or annuities markets.

Each consumer makes the following

contract with an insurance compapy: as long as he (she) lives, (s)he receives

a rate of return

p

on his (her) eotal financial asset holdings at each

instant.

When (s)he dies, the entire estate accrues to the insurance

company.

(If

premium rate

a is negative, the consumer pays the insurance company a
p,

with his (her) debt cancelled when (s)he dies).

insurance industry is competitive with free entry.

The

There is a large number of

).. is both the instantaneous

peo·ple (or 'cohort') born at each instant, and

probability of death for an individual and the fraction of each cohort (and
theref?re of the total population) which dies at each instant.

The

competitive (zero expected) profit) rate of return paid by or to the insurance
company 1s therefore

p

= X.

(Uote, not

p

= n + X, where n 1s the

instantaneous proportional population growth rate.
cohort dies each instant, so a fraction

A fraction _).. of each

X of the economy's non-human wealth
It is this that gets paid

accrues to the insurance compani~s each instant.

out by the insurance companies to the ,survi vin·g agents).
Integrating {3) forward in time and imposing the terminal boundary
condition (4), we obtain the individual household's intertemporal budget
constraint or solvency constraint given in (Sa,b)

(4)

lim a \s,2.) e- f~(r(u)+X)du = 0
2,+c:,

-J:(-c(u)+:\.)du
{5a)

~

dv

=a

(s,t)

+.

h (s,t)

-s-

SUO/wb-1/08-27-86

'fi<s,t)

(Sb)

his the consumer's human capital, the present discounted value (using the
"risk-adjusted" discount rate
income.

(Sb')

r + X) of expected future a·ter-tax labor

Note that (Sb) implies~

:t

h(s,t)

= (r(t)+X)

h (s,t) - (~(s,t) -;(s,t))

The consumption function generated by this maximization program 1s
well-known to be:

cCs,t) =Co+ x)( aCs,t> + hCs,t>)

(6)

Equations (3), (Sb') and (6) imply

d -c(s,t) = (r(t) - o) -c(s,t)
dt

(6')

B.

Aggregation
At each instant a new age cohort composed of many agents is born.

·
·
nt
The size of thP- cohort born at time tis (n + X)e , n

~

O.

Since X, the

(constant) instantaneous probability of death -of an agent, is also the
fraction of agents in each cohort which die at each instant, the size of the
surviving cohort at time t which was born at times$ tis (n+A) e

ns

e

-X(t-s)

Total populatioa at any instant tis given by (n+X) e -H .(t e (X+n)sd s =
CD

e

nt

For any individual agent's stock or flow variable ;(s,t) we define
the corresponding population aggregate V(t) tc be

•

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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Each agent, regardless of age, earns the same wage income and pays
the same taxes, i.e.

(Sb)

T(s,t) = T(t)

It follows that each surviving agent has the same human capital.

(8c)

h(s,t) = h(t),

By. straightforward direct computation, and using the notational

convention given in (7), aggregate consumption is given by:

(9a)

C(t) = (o+l) (A(t~ + H(t))

(9b)

A(t) - r(t) A(t) + W(t) - T(t) - C(t) l/

(9c)

H(t) _ (r+l+n) H(t) + T(t) - W(t) ~/

•

1/

We use the iact that a(t,t) = O, i.e. consumers are born without financi~l
assets or liabilities.

2/

We use -h(t,t)e nt = -h(t)e nt = H(t).

SUO/wb-1/08-27-86
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The absence of a \A term in (9b), unlike in (3), reflects the fact
that the insurance companies' activities involve a transfer from those who die
to those who survive, which does not alter the rate of return on aggregate
non-human wealth.

The presence of the nH term in (9c) reflects the fact that

all surviving agents, even the newborn, have the same human capital.
There is a constant ins~antaneous proportional rate of growth of
productivity

11'.

Technical change is labor-augmenting or Harrod-neutral.

By

choice of units, the level of productivity at t = 0 is set equal to unity.
For each p~pulation agg~egate stock or flow variable V, the
corresponding quantity "per unit of labor measured in efficiency units," v, 1s
defined by:

{10)

v(t) _ V(t)e-(n+'ll')t

this notational convention, consumption per unit of efficiency
U.sing
.
.
labor is governed by:

{lla)

c = ( o+\ )(a+h)

{llb)

a_

{llc)

! _ (r+~-w)h +, -

(r-(n+'ll'))a +

W -

,

-

C

w

These last three equations imply:

or

SUD/wb~l/08-27-86
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(12')

C.

Production, the public sector and market equilibrium

Production is governed by a smooth twice-continuously differentiable
neoclassical constant returns to scale production function.
efficiency units of labor are the two inputs.

Capital and

Let y denote output per unit of

efficiency labor and k capital per unit of efficiency labor, then:

(13a)

y = f(k); f'>O; f">O; f(O)=O; lim f'=a.; lim f'=O.

k+a.

k+O

Competitive labor and financial markets ensure that:

(13b)

r = f 1 (k)

(13c)

w

= f(k) - kf'(k).

Note that w is th~ wage rate per unit of efficiency labor.

When w is

constant, each worker's wage grows at the proportional rate~.
The goverr.ment spends on goods and services g, levies lump-sum taxes
T

and borrows by issuing government debt.
·1

efficiency labor)~

1/

(g,

T

and bare per unit of

I

I am assuming that government spending on·goods and services is neither
useful as public sector capital formation nor as public consumption in the
private utilit) function. g could be entered additively into the
intantaneous private utility function without affecting any of the results
(except of cou'"se the welfare economics of variations in g). For the
i•sue· of debt neutrality, the role of g is not relevant.

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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The government's instantaneous budget identity is:

(14)

b _ g - , + (r - (n+n))b

Integrating the government's budget identity forward 1n time and
imposing the terminal boundary condition given in (15) we obtain the familiar
government intertemporal or present value budget constraint, or its solvency
constraint, given in (16).

(15)

(16")

b(t) -

-fvt(r(u)-(n+n))du
dv
f t (~(v)-g(v))e
a,

Equilibri~m 1n the goods market requires that:

(17)

k = y - ~ - g - (n+n)k

Since there are only two non-human assets, capital and government

debt, it follows that:

(18)

III.

a= k + b

Debt (non-) Neutrality:

A General Statem1>.nt

It is evident from equations (11) to -(~8) that, given a path of g(t),
variations in the government's paths or rules for lump-sum taxes, ., can only
affect current andior future values of c, k, y, wand r by influencing private

consumption.

The conditions for debt neutrality are therefore simply the

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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conditions for c to be independent of the current and future values of,, as
long as the path of g is left unchanged.

In what follows, the analysis is

restricted to paths or rules for, consistent with government solvency, as
defined in (16):

the present discounted value of future primary (i~e~ net of

interest) government surpluses should be equal to (and therefore sufficient to
service) the initial debt.

The relevant discount rate is the real interest

rate net of the rate of growth of labor in efficiency units r-(n+~).

Population growth and productivit y growth both expand the future resource base
on which the government can levy taxes to serve the debt.
Integrating (llc) forward in time and imposing the terminal boundary
condition (19), we obtain human capital per unit of labor measured in
efficiency units, h, as given in (20).

(19)

·-r·c r(u)+\-~ )du

lim h(Jl.)e t

= 0

Jl.+111

(20)

-fv(r(u)+\-~ )du
h(t) = f;(w(v)-,(v )e t
dv

Substitute for h(t) in the consumption function (lla) using (2~) and
for a(t) using (18).

and rearrange.

(21)

c(t)

Then add and subtract the term

This yields:

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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The last term on the r.h.s. of (21) is the crucial one for debt
neutrality.

Comparing it with the government solvency constraint (16) shows

that this last term on the r.h.s. of (21) will vanish i.f.f. A+ n = O.
If A+ n * O, i.e. 1n practice (ignoring the case of negative population
growth) if A+ n > O,

debt neutrality will not hold.

This is the most

general statement of the conditions for debt neutrality.

What follows becomes

more specific by putting some restrictions on the paths of taxes.
Consider two economies identical in all respects except for the·
initial stock of debt, which is greater in economy I, and for current and
future lump-s~m taxes which differ between the two economies in such a way as
to ensure government solvency for both economy I and economy II, in spite of
the _larger initial stock of debt in economy

= AII = X; ir1
r 1 (v) = rII(v) =
AI

-

1T

II

= ir;

r(v), gI(v)

I

= k II (t) =
= gII(v) = g(v)

k (t)

r.

o1 =on= o;

I.e.

k(t);

w

I

II'

(v) = w (v)

for all v ~ t.

= w(v),

To maintain·

government solvency with bI(t) > bII(t) we require, from (16) that

Adding a·,1d subtracting the term f"".(.1(v)--rII(v))e-f;(r(u)+X-1T)du dv
t

in (22) and rearr.rnging yields:

{23)

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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It is clear that the higher initial debt 1n economy I could be
serviced by tax policies that have, I (v) ~, II (v) for
all v ~ t and , 1 (v) > ,II(v) for at least one finite interval of time beyond·
t.

For all such policies, the second term on the r.h.s. of (23) is strictly

positive for A+ n > O.

It equals zero for A+ n = O.

Let us call this term O(t), i.e.

n(t)

(24)

It is the excess of the present discounted value of the differences
in future taxes using the government's effective discount rate r-(n+n) over
the present discounted value of the differences in future taxes using the
private sector's effective discount rate r+A-n.
The difference in private consumption between the two economies 1s
given by

For the strictly higher path of taxes £n economy I (i.e.
with , 1 (v) ~ , 1 I(v) for all v and ,I(v) > , 11 (v) for some finite

interval), n(t) is strictly positive if and only if A+ n > O, because 1n that
case the household sector discounts a positive stream of differences using a

higher effective discQunt rate than the government.!/

!/

This result will also hold for many policies for which , 1 (v) <,,II(~) for
some finite i~terval(s), but the proofs became very case-specific. The
behavior of taxes in the model studied in Section IV is characterized by
, 1 (v) < , 11 (v) for small v and T 1 (v) > , 11 (v) for large v.

- 13 -
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To establish absence of debt neutrality, we only have to show
!:hat cI(t)

*

cII(t) if bI(t)

*

bII(t) and only lump-sum taxes differ between

economies I and II to maintain government solvency.

In fact we have shown

more, by establishing a strong presuinption of "financial crowding out":
II
I
II .
I
b (t) > b (t) was seen to imply c (t) > c (t) if and onlj if l + n > 0 for
the class of tax policies considered.

How this incipient increase in private

consumption is translated into actual behavior is very model-specific , as it
depends on the behavior of current and future expected interest rates and wage
rates.

Some degree of financial crowding out seems likely, however, and the

closed economy example solved in the next section confirms this.

In a small

open economy with an exogenous interest rate, the crowding out would take the
form of public debt displacing net .foreign assets rather than real capital
(see Blanchard (1985) and Suiter (1986a)).
The findings of this section ~an be summarized as follows:
Proposition:

A+ n = 0 is necessary and sufficient for debt
neutrality

Corollary:

if l + n = O,

,r

* 0 does not invalidate debt

neutral tty.
Finally note that Blanchard's measure of fiscal stance F(t) becom~s
(see Blanchard (1985)).

(26)

F(t)
-fvr(d+l-1r)du
+ (~+X)(b(t)-f;( ,(v)-g(v))e t

dv)

We have already discussed the third term on the r.h.s. of (26), the
financing term.

The first and second term given the effect of public spending

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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on aggregate (private plus public) consumption demand, at given current and
expected future interest rates and wage rates.

Demand is boosted by public

consumption spending to the extent that its current value exceeds the
"permanent" value defined by the second term on the r.h.s. of (26). ·

Financial Crowding Out and Fiscal Policy:

IV.

An Example

In this section, I complete the model of Section II by adding a
behavioral relationship for taxes which has the following properties:

(1) it

almost certainly stabilizes th~ public debt process; (2) it pins down very
transparently the change in the long-run level of taxes and (3) a long-run
increase in taxation is preceded by a short-run cut in taxes and vice ver•sa.
As

shown in (27). feeds back from the deficit.

(27)

• = •

0

+ 8b

8 < -1

Under this rule, the debt dynamics is governed by:

In the long run (b = O), taxes are given by • •
0

An increase

in • , however, implies in the short run a reduction in, which disappears
0
gradually and changes into an eventual increase:

(29)

1

• = 1+8

10

8

9

+ 1+8 g + l+a (r - (n + n))b

I have assumed, as I shall in what follows, that r > n + n, i.e. that
the "intrinsic" debt-deficit dynamics is explosive, because the real interest

.L

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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rater exceeds the long-run growth rate of the tax base, n + n.

Assigning the

·value -2 to 8 as was done in Suiter (1986a) results in the debt-deficit
process becoming the exact mirror image of what it would be under exogenous
taxes (8 = 0) since with 8 = -2 we have

(29')

• = -.

0

+ 2g + 2(r-(n+~))b

and
(28'}

•

b = -(g-, ).- (r-(n+n))b
0.

The state-space repr~sentatio~ of the model with equation (27) added
involves three state variables.
equations (30a, b, c).

One possible representation is given below 1n

The linearization of the system around a stationary

equitibrium k0 , ho and b0 is given 1n (31).

= f(k)

(30a)

k

(30b)

h=

- (o+A) (b+k+h) - g - (n+n)k

(f'(k)+l-n) h + - 1- .
1-8

0

+

8
1-8

g + - 8-

1-8

(f'(k)-(n+n))b
.

(30c)

•

h
(31)

•

b
•

h

,I

r-(o+l+n+n)

-Co+:>.)

-(o+l)

I
= I bf"{l+e)-l
i

,_

i (h+k~b)f"
l+e

(r-(n+n)}(l+e)-l

!

1 8

(r-(n+n))

k-k

0

b-b

r+l-n

h-h

0

0
0

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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The characteristic equation of the state matrix Sin ~31) 1s

3

·

2

(32a)

+ b p
2
with

(32b)

b = -((3+2e)(r-n) - (l+e)o - (2+e)n)(l+e)-l
2

p

+ b p + b = 0
1
0

(32c)

+ ( o+A )(h+k+b)f"

(32d)

+ (6·H)f"( (h+k)(r-(n+n)) + b{ r+A-1t))}

The following relations hold between the three roots P , P ,
2
1

_,:>

3

and

the coefficients of the polynomial b , b , b :
2
1
3

(33a)

(33b)

(33c)

The dyn~mic system in (31) has two predetermined state variables (k
and b) and -0ne non-pred~termined state variable (h).

1/

det(S) means determinant of the matrix S.

For there to be a

SUD/wb~l/08-27-86
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(locally) unique continuously convergent solution to (21), the characteristic
equation (32a) should have two stable characteristic roots, pl and

p

2

say,

with negative real parts and ·one unstable (positive) characteristic
root,

p

say.

3

A necessary condition for there to be the desired saddlepoint

= det(S)

conflguration is b
0

O.

>

Since

brackets in (32d) should be negative.

e

< -1, the term inside the curly

In open economy versions of this model

with perfect capital mobility, rand therefore k is fixed exogenously and the
second term inside the curly brackets of (32d) is absent.

In these models the

saddlepoint condition becomes (see Blanchard (1985) and Suiter (1986a}):

(34}

(r-(6+l+n+n))(r+l-n)(r-(n+n}) < 0

This will be satisfied if

r > n+n

(35a)

and
r < 6 + l + n + n

(35b)

With n

~

0 and l

~

O, (35a) implies r

~

l - n > O.

I shall assume that (34a,

b} hold.!/
A positive value of b

0

= det(S)

could have been generated by three

unstable roots rather than two stable and one unstable root.
either b

1/

2

= Trace(S)

SO or b

1

Given det(S) =O,

SO is suffici~nt {but net necessary) for

(34) tould also hold if all three
negative.

oi

r-(5+1+n+~), r+l-n and r-(n+n) were

- 18 -
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the desired saddlepoint configuration.
that r

~

that with

o+w is sufficient for b 1 < O.
9

It is clear from (32c) and (35a, b)
It can also be checked easily

= -2, the first two terms on the r.h.s. of (32c) sum to

2
-[l(l+o+n)+no+(r-(n+w )) ].

This will be negative if r > n+w.

stnc~ the last·

term on the r.h.s. of (32c) is also negative, the conditions given in (3Sa,b)
are sufficient for the desired saddlepoint configuration if 8 = -2 •
•
•
In long-run steady-state equilibrium, a= b = k = 0 and

a = b + k

r = f'(k)

w

= f(k) - kf'(k)

These seven equations determine the long-run equilibrium values of~,
a, h, b, k, wand r as functions of g, , 0 , o, 1, n and ff.
values of k and c can·be solved conveniently from (36a, b).

(36a)

(36b)

c = f(k) -g-(n+ff)k.

The key long-run

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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Solving this fork as a function of • 0 , g, o, l, n and n we get

(37a)

k

= ljl(-rO' g, o, l, n, n)

with
(37b)

"'·

=
0

(o+\)(nH)
( r-(n+n)) ( r.+\ "-n)

N-1 .

(37c)

-1 ( r-(n+\+n+o))
illg = N
.r-(n+,r)

(37d)

N

l
b
= r-(o+)..+n+,r) + (o+\)f" ( h+k +
r-(n+n)'
r+\-,r

From (35a, b) it follows that N < O.
The remaining long-run multipliers will be discussed in the next
section.
Since the assumption that r > n+n and r < n+\+,r+o implies N < O, it
follows that a higher long-run level of lump-s:1m taxes is associated with a
stock (ill T
lower long-run canital
•

< 0) unless n + \ = 0 in which case debt
0

neutrality prevails and the long-run capital stock is unaffected.

ll

A higher long-run level.of public consumption is associated with a

higher long-run capital stock when A +. n > O. : Consider the case where )..+n=O.
From equation (11') it follows that stationary equilibria with a non-zero
value of care ch3racterized by r=o+ir.

In that case, changes in g will not be

associated with a:iy long-run changes ink but will simply displace an equal
amount of private consumption (see equation 36b).

1/

Whether these are short-run

Indeed the capital stock and private consumption at each instant are
unaffected if \+n=O.

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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effects on capital formation from an increase 1n g when A+n=O depends on
whether the current change in public spending 1s equal to or differs from the
"pet:manent" le~el of;g(v)e-f;(r(u)-1r)dudv (see equation 26).
Note that (37b) confirms our Proposition and its Corollary:
neutrality(~
neutrality.

·o

debt

= 0) requires n+A=O; if n+A=O, 1r*O does not destroy debt

.

It is the difference between the public sector's future tax base

{the resources of individuals alive today or yet to be born) and the future
tax base of the indiyiduals that are alive today (the resources owned by those
individuals only, and not- the resources of individuals yet to be born) that
accounts for the non-neutrality of variations over time in the pattern of
lump-sum taxation.
at~ rate 1r-A.
rate n+n.

The individual's expected future flow of resources grows

The government's expected future flow of resources grows at a

Unless an individual is linked, through intergenerational gift and

bequest motives to all those born_ after himself (herself), the resources of
these future generations are not integrated into his (her) intertemporal
budget constraint.

An

infinite lifetime (X = 0) 1s not the same as

intergenerational concern, nor does it imply the ability to effect the desired
intergenerational transfers of resources.

Productivity growth, when n+A=O,

augments the individual's resources over time in the same way as it augments
the government's tax base.
The specific "crowding out" story associated with an increase
in

i:

0

in our model is some intrinsic interest.

where e=-2.

Take for concreteness the case

From (29') it is clear that, since r=f'(k) is given at a point in

time, an increas~ 10 long-run lump-sum taxes

i:

0

implies an equal and

oppositive reduction in _taxes at the initial date t 0 •

From (28 1 ) this

generates a government deficit which is financed by borrowing.

As the debt.

increases taxes are raised until they exceed thiir initial value and rise

1..
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beyond it .to the new higher level of , • Capital will be decumulated in the
0
process, which will raise the interest rate. Taxes, however, respond to such
debt-service increases (see 29').

The higher taxes 1n the long run are

required to service the increased stock of debt due to the early deficits
associated with the early tax cut.

Since the stable roots may be complex

conjugate, the approach to the steady state may involve oscillatory

behavior.

The details of the dynamic adjustment will depend on whether and

when the change in ,

0

was anticipated.

The higher volume of long-run debt 1s associated with a long-run
capital stock (ljl

'o

< 0 1n (37b)) and thus a higher interest rate.

That the

long-run stock of debt is indeed higher can be seen from

db
d-.

1
0

= r-(r,-rr)

b

r-(n+,r)

f"ljl

'o

i.e.

1
= ---:----,•

db
d-.

0

r-(n+ir)

b(oH) (nH) f"
]
[ l- b( o+A) (n+A) f 11 +( r-(n+,r)
)( r+X-ir )( r-( 6+X+n+ir) )+( o+X )( r-(n+ir)) f" (h+k+b)

This is posltive given (35a, b).

Human capital falls in the'long run:
and ,

0

is higher.

- is higher, w 1s lower

Consumption obviously decli:n::s since

- 22 -
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Financial wealth 1s affected in an ambiguous manner.

In the long run

{o+,r-r)(w --ro)
a = .,.{_r_+_A.--,r-).-{,...r--"""'(,..n_+_,r_+_o_+_:\.-:-)-:-)

At given interest rates, a higher value of -r 0 will raise a
if 6+,r>r, lower a otherwise . The decline in was k declines reinforce s
this.

The endogene ity_of r does, however, leave the total effect ambiguou s:

=

The dynamic story for the increase 1n g is also quite intuitive .
Spe~ding is raised a~ t=t 0 and is kept at its new higher level. From {29'),
however, taxes are increased immediate ly by twice the amount of the increase
in g.

A budget surplus results and debt is retired.

As debt is retired,

taxes gradually (possibly in an oscillati ng manner) go back to their initial
value -r •
0

The lower debt and lower debt service (note that since k increases

in the long run, r falls) permit the higher·lo ng-run level of ~ublic spending
with unchanged long-run taxes.

The exact time pattern of consumpti on a~d

capital accumula tion will of course depend on whether or not the increase in g
· was anticipat ed, when it was anticipat ed etc.

V.

The Long-Run Comparati ve Statics of the "Deep Structura l" Private Sector
Parameter s
Even though the populatio n growth rate nan the probabil ity of

death X enter the criterion for debt neutralit y ~ymmetri cally, i.e. as n+:\., a
change inn will not affect any endogenou s variable of the system in the same
way as a change i~ l, unless ( l) these changes ·are evaluated at l=n=O (and
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therefore at a stationary equilibrium with r=o+,r) and (2) only a subset of the
·endogenous variables (k, rand w but not c, h, band a) are considered.

This

can.be shown by solving for the remaining long-run reduced form derivatives of
equation (37a), reproduced below:

k =

<·o, g, o, X, n,

II>

"IT).

N-l(b+k.+h) < 0

(37e)

11>6 =

(37£)

r-(,r+o)
11'>. = N-l(b+k r+X-,r . h)

(37g)

N-l( (o+X) b+k) < 0
1',n =
r-(n+rr)

(37h) .

1',lr =

N-1( (o+X) b + (o+X)h+k) < 0
r-(n+,r)
r+x~n

N, defined in (37d) is negative.

Not surprisingly,.an increase in the rate of time preference,-an
increase in the population growth rate and an increase in the rate of labor~

augmenting technical change all reduce•the long-run capital-labor ratio
{measured in efficiency units).

An

increase in the probability of death, 1,:e.

a reduction in life expectancy will also reduce long-run k unless r is very
much below ,r+o.
Since~-• = N-l((r-(n+1T+o+X))b + (r-(1T+o))h)
X n
r-(n+1T)
r+X-,r
'
than •n (i.~.

•x will be smaller numerically)

If r > n + o and.b

= 0,

•x will be larger

if r < n + o.

~A will be smaller (numerically larger) than •n•

SUD/wb-1/08-27-86
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.,

If r >

~

+ 6 and b > O, the sign of ~A-wn depends on the specific values of

the parameters.
When A= n = 0 and r =

(37e')

1
~6 = N- (b+k+h)

(37f')

1
~A = N- (b+k)

(37g')

~n = N-l(b+k)

(37h)

~n

~

+ 6 (37e to h) become

= N-l(b+k+h)

Thus when there is debt neutrality, a small increase 1n A or inn
wilt have the same effect on k.

A small increase in 6 will have the same

effect on k as ~mall increase in i.

The effects on c of small changes

in A and n around zero will of course be quite different from each other since
in that case

VI.

Conclusion
The Yaari-Blanchard model of consumer behavior has been generalized

to allow for population growth and productivity growth.

Bl~nchard's finding,

in models without population growth and productivity growth, that uncertain
lifetimes destroy debt neutrality and Weil's finding that, in a model without
uncertain lifetimes and productivity growth, population growth alone destroys
debt neutrality, are special cases of the gener~l model.

If and only if the
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sum of the population growth rate and the individual's probability of dea~h is
zero will there be debt neutrality.

Non-zero productivity growth by itself

does not destroy debt neutrality.
Note that debt neutrality, when A+n=O, occurs because the government•
satisfies its intertemporal present value budget constraint, i.e. because the
government is solvent in the sense defined by equation (16).

It is therefore

not correct to say, if A+n=O, that debt neutrality implies that the
government's tax program doesn't matter.

The correct statement is that any

tax program that maintains solvency doesn't matter.

If solvency is

threatened, 1.e. if the terminal condition that the present discounted value
(using r-(n+n) to discount) of the debt burden (debt per unit of efficiency
labor or debt~GDP ratio) goes to zero does not hold, there will not be debt
neutrality, regardless of the value of n+A.
The analysis has been deliberately restricted to the case of lump
sum, non-distortiona ry taxes.

Non lump-sum taxes have (dis)incentive effects

that will destroy debt neutrality even when n+A=O and the government remains
solvent.
new.

Here toe, however, the Yaari-Blanchard model contributes something

As shown in Suiter (1986b), when there is a single "conventional" .

distortion such as a non~lump-sum tax, changes in the distortionary tax rate

may have

first-order income effects even when they are evaluated at a zero

value of the distortionary tax rate.

This result occurs when r~o+n, which can

be the case in well-behaved stationary equilibria of the Yaari-Blanchard model
if n+HO.

The discrepancy between the interest rate and the pure rate of time

preference plus the rate of labor augmentation acts like a second, "intrinsic"
distortion and lands us in the realm of second-best even when there is but one
conventional distortion.
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Finally, the Yaari-Blanchard model!/ may well become the workhorse
of the late eighties for analytical macroeconomic research and teaching,
beca_use of its simplicity and flexibility.

1/

Especially 1n its more complex but more general version with instantaneous
utility represented ~ya constant relative risk aversion function
1 -µ
-c;µ<l.
µ

SUD/wb-l/08-2f-86

- 27 -

References
Blanchard, O. J. [1984] "Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates and
Economic Activity." European Economic Review, 25 No. 1, June, pp. 727.
Blanchard, O. J. [1985] "Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons."
Political Economy, 93, April, pp. 223-47.

Journal of

Buiter, W. H. (1986a] "Fiscal Policy in Open, Interdependent Economies," in
Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, edited by A. Razin and E.
Sadka, MacMillan, London.
Buiter, W. H. [1986b] "Structural and Stabilization Aspects of Fiscal and
Financial Policy in the Dependent Economy," unpublished, August.
Weil, P. (1985] Essays on the Valuation of Unbacked Assets.
Ph.D. Thesis.

May, Harvard

Yaari, M. E. (1965] "Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory ofthe
Consumer," Review of Economic Studies, 32, April, pp. 137-150.

